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1. INTRODUCTION 
Cybercrime is a broad concept encompassing numerous illegal activities 
occurring online or on computer systems (Yar, 2006). It includes behaviors such as 
system hacking, copying or removing information from a computer, and adjusting or 
crippling a system entirely (Wilson, 2001; Yar, 2006). This form of crime has become a 
growing concern in both the United States and abroad (Goodman, 2010; Holt & Bossler, 
2013; Morris & Blackburn, 2009; Young & Zhang, 2007; Young, Zhang, & Prybutok, 
2007). One form of cybercrime, system trespassing, is of particular concern as it involves 
unauthorized hacking or access onto a computer system in order to obtain information or 
alter aspects of the system (Yar, 2006). This has the potential to be very problematic for 
both citizens and companies considering the harm that offenders trespassing could cause 
should they be able to breach a system and access or alter the information it holds. CSID, 
a security division with Experian, notes that in 2014 approximately 8.5 million people 
were victims of reported illegal data breaches, indicating numerous likely victims of 
system trespassing who have had their personal or financial data compromised (CSID, 
2017). Financial losses resulting from cyber attacks and breaches can approach the 
billions of dollars in the United States alone (McAffee, 2013). As such, system 
trespassing has the potential to cause great harm in both the form of confidential 
information breaches and financial losses. Measures that could potentially reduce the 
number of these attacks or, at the very least, that could alter the actions or behaviors of 
trespassers are of growing consideration as possible ways to help mitigate the damage 
caused. 
This thesis seeks to address this challenge by examining how system trespassers 
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respond to the presentation of a series of messages displayed on the computer indicating 
that they have been detected on the system. Even with a growing body of literature on 
cybercrime (D’Arcy,Hovav, & Galleta, 2009; Higgins, Wilson, & Fell, 2005; Maimon, et 
al., 2014; Maimon, et al., 2015; Wilson et al. 2015) it is difficult to determine how system 
trespassers will respond to notifications that they are being monitored, but it is 
theoretically plausible that these messages will result in trespassers changing their 
behavior given that the messages do indicate that they have been detected. Specifically, 
they may adjust what commands they enter into the computer system, or they may even 
change their identifying Internet Protocol (IP) Address in order to return to the system 
later under a different address that has not been detected. Utilizing a restrictive deterrence 
perspective, this thesis seeks to explore instances of unauthorized system trespassing and 
how implying detection towards the perpetrators may influence how they proceed with 
the trespassing event. It will then contribute further to the growing body of literature on 
restrictive deterrence and cybercrime (Maimon, et al., 2014; Maimon, et al., 2015; Testa 
et al., 2017; Wilson et al. 2015), through which the information gained can help expand 
our theoretical ideas of the behavior of system trespassers, and can influence further 
discussions on possible preventative measures for system operators to take to reduce 
instances of trespassing.  
2. BACKGROUND 
2.1 System Trespassing 
System, or computer, trespassing involves entering another’s computer system 
without permission (Maimon et al., 2014; Maimon et al., 2015; Wilson, 2001; Yar, 2006). 
This includes illegal hacking in broader terms, as well as accessing systems to cause 
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more serious damage through the use of installed malware or by obtaining confidential 
files and information stored on the system (Jordan & Taylor, 1998; Marcum et al., 2014; 
Morris & Blackburn, 2009; Taylor, 1999). System trespassing generally involves several 
stages: reconnaissance, network scanning, collecting information to aid in guessing 
passwords, exploiting the systems’ weak areas, and ending with the completion of the 
intrusion and beginning of the damage or other illicit activities (Maimon et al., 2015; 
Wilson, 2001). Figure 1 portrays the progression of these events. The beginning stages of 
reconnaissance and scanning involve would-be trespassers searching online for any 
information to better understand the targeted system and its users in order to both 
increase their chances of a successful attack and to identify any valuable information that 
they may want. The information gained during these stages also allows for trespassers to 
move to the next stages of their attack, which is again searching online and around the 
system to identify weak points and information pertinent to passwords and login 
information. By doing this, they may find ways for quicker and easier access, which 
could then reduce their chances of being caught or identified before they can complete 
their intrusion. The real damage comes from the final stage, which is the execution of the 
attack that occurs once full access to the system is obtained. More damage can occur here 
as trespassers will attempt to gather information by entering different command 
keystrokes, install or create malware, or conduct other illicit and potentially damaging 
acts on a system (Maimon et al., 2015; Wilson, 2001). Completions of cyber-attacks can 
be costly with damages from malware or ransomware1
 
or other attacks potentially 
reaching in the billions of dollars annually (Norton, 2016). 
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Figure 1: Stages of a System Trespassing Event 
 
2.2 Theoretical Perspective 
While system trespassing can result in serious consequences, preventing attacks is 
by no means straightforward. However, the deterrence framework in criminology offers 
some insights on ways to prevent or reduce its occurrence. The concept of deterrence 
within criminology largely comes from the late 18th century work of Beccaria (1963 
[1764]) and Bentham (1970 [1785]), whose writings developed ideas about punishment 
and how it may deter individuals from engaging in illegal or immoral acts. The 
deterrence perspective within criminology is often considered broad and sometimes 
vague (Gibbs, 1975), but it is focused primarily on the perceived indications of the 
certainty, severity, and celerity of punishment (Gibbs, 1975; Jacobs, 2010; Loughran et 
al., 2011; Nagin & Paternoster, 1991; Pogarsky, 2002; Wenzel, 2004). Perceptions are of 
particular importance in many cases given that possible offenders may weigh the costs 
and benefits of committing a crime. If the perceived costs, whether informal or formal, 
are deemed too high by the individual offender then they will theoretically avoid 
committing the offense. Not everyone can be completely deterred however, as some will 
still engage in offenses but will alter their behavior to an extent in order to reduce their 
chances of apprehension. 
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absolute and restrictive deterrence. Absolute deterrence results in a potential offender 
being fully deterred from engaging in a crime, resulting in a complete refrain from ever 
engaging in criminal activities at any point or a complete desistence from any future 
offending if they have already been caught and punished. Restrictive deterrence however, 
is of primary interest in this study as we are examining system trespassers who have 
already illegally entered a system, but who may yet change their offending behaviors. 
Possible adjustments to behavior highlighted by Gibbs (1975), and expended upon by 
Jacobs (2010) include reducing the frequency of offending, offending at times and in 
locations where the likely risks are low, or by reducing the severity of the offenses 
committed. All of these changes are significant from a restrictive deterrence perspective 
as they allow for people to still offend, but in such a way that they reduce their chances of 
incurring punishment, or even reducing how punitive the sanctions are should they get 
caught. 
These behavioral adjustments that are discussed in the restrictive deterrence 
perspective are often the results of offenders applying what they have observed or learned 
in order to best avoid detection. Examples of these changes are seen in Jacobs and 
Cherbonneau’s (2014) interviews with auto thieves. The thieves interviewed noted that 
they take care in selecting their victims, and that they would also make adjustments to 
their behavior in order to appear as normal as possible to better avoid apprehension. 
Jacobs (1993) also discusses restrictive deterrence as it applies to drug dealers by noting 
how they rely on both physical and non- physical cues to help them identify whether or 
not it is safe to sell to a specific person. These examples show how offenders can still 
engage in an offense while also paying enough attention to risks to attempt to avoid 
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punishment. This implies deeper analyses and consideration of risks on the offender’s 
part, but it also implies that offenders can be actively learning different behaviors, which 
then ties in some elements of learning theory in with restrictive deterrence. This is 
significant for offenses such as cybercrime given that would-be offenders have to first 
learn a variety of elements of computer systems before they can cause any harm (Skinner 
& Fream, 1997). What they learn may then translate to whether or not they respond to 
certain deterrents or not. 
Whether or not an offender is deterred completely or partially can depend on 
different factors. Pogarsky (2002) argues that some people are more influenced by 
potential punishments than others, implying that there is variation in the “deterrability” of 
offenders, an idea which Jacobs (2010) also supports and expands upon by suggesting 
that some individuals will be deterred while others will not. For those who are deterred in 
part, there is more risk sensitivity and awareness involved, but not enough to fully deter 
them from committing an offense. A meta- synthesis conducted by Moeller, Copes and 
Hochstetler (2016) reveals patterns in the literature on deterrability. They note through 
this examination that some people are indeed less likely to be deterred completely, but 
they may still be influenced by risks and thus restrictive deterrence may still apply. These 
risks can influence offenders to find ways to avoid detection or altering behaviors if it 
seems they may be caught otherwise. 
2.3 Deterrence in Cyber Space 
An existing argument on what may impact whether or not punishment deters 
potential offenders, whether completely or not, relates to perceptions. In particular, focus 
is on the perceived certainty and severity of punishments, with indications that it is the 
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certainty of punishment that is more important (Loughran et al., 2011; Nagin & 
Paternoster, 1991). Nagin and Pogarsky (2001) in a study focusing on drunk driving, find 
through surveys administrated among undergraduate students, find that while severity 
and certainty of punishment had an effect in some models, certainty of punishment was 
most consistently related to intention inhibition. In relation to cybercrime, Higgins, 
Wilson and Fell (2005) and Peace, Galletta, and Thong (2003) find the certainty element 
is most important for digital piracy deterrence. Certainty of punishment then is clearly 
important in determining whether or not someone engages in crime. For cybercrime 
however, this is particularly significant given the anonymity offenders enjoy and the 
relatively low levels of prosecution (Jordan & Taylor, 1998) which can both heavily 
reduce offender’s perceived certainty. Still, even with increases in certainty, there is 
likely to be variation in how much is required for different people to be deterred 
completely, but restrictive deterrence could still be applicable in many cases. In 
particular, and within this study, merely offering an implied risk of discovery even 
without mention of punishment may be enough to warrant some changes in the behavior 
of the trespassers. 
In the context of cyberspace and system trespassing, elements of restrictive 
deterrence could be seen in several ways. Trespassers may take the time to analyze 
potential targets beforehand to assess the risks of attacking that particular system, or they 
may look into ways to reduce the likelihood of detection. One possible way to avoid 
detection in cyberspace is through IP spoofing, where hackers will change their 
identifying Internet Protocol (IP) Addresses in order to fool others of their identity 
(Jordan & Taylor, 1998; Yar, 2006). This allows for greater anonymity among system 
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users and trespassers, which could then decrease the perceived likelihood of discovery 
and punishment, even if they are presented with signals indicating that the system is 
being monitored. More confident offenders may not view system monitoring as a 
significant risk if they believe themselves to be anonymous or untraceable. 
This anonymity allowed by the inherent nature of the Internet and technology 
makes catching and punishing trespassers challenging (Holt & Kilger, 2012; Jordan & 
Taylor, 1998). Given the importance of punishment certainty for deterrence, it could be 
argued that increasing the perceptions of detection and punishment for system trespassers 
could improve deterrence and reduce the number of trespassing events. Young and Zhang 
(2007) make this argument for cyber offenders with findings indicating that by increasing 
the certainty, or even simply the attacker’s perception of it, at any stage of the trespassing 
event may result in the trespasser concluding their attack before causing any damage. 
However, an opposing argument exists suggesting that this may not apply to all 
trespassers as some researchers argue that hackers may actually enjoy the challenge of 
avoiding detection (Goodman, 2010; Young & Zhang, 2007; Young, Zhang, & Prybutok, 
2007), making it difficult then to predict or possibly alter their behavior. This creates 
dueling positions in regards to deterring system trespassers with the introduction of 
certain security measures, such as a warning banner or direct messages, possibly 
deterring some offenders while presenting an enticing challenge to others. It is also 
possible that offenders may simply be confident that they will not be caught or punished 
regardless of what messages they are presented with. 
It is worth noting this opposing position that argues that the deterrence 
perspective is not always considered the most effective at explaining cybercrime. Rather, 
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other approaches such as social learning are thought to be more effective. The skills 
required for almost any form of cybercrime need to be taught or conveyed to would-be 
offenders. These skills may be self-taught in part, but trespassers will likely receive 
influence from others who have experience hacking in the past, given the complexity of 
computer systems (Holt, Burgess, & Bossler, 2010). As such, the impacts that peers may 
have on trespassers are worth discussing as what is taught or conveyed could shape how 
they respond to certain scenarios. For example, Marcum and colleagues (2014) found 
when surveying juveniles that having more deviant peers was related to unauthorized 
access of social media and emails. Morris and Blackburn (2009) also find in a survey of 
undergraduate students that peer associations were more impactful on the more serious 
cyber offenders. It is possible that having peers or closer friends that engage in 
cybercrime can then influence one to also try and engage in offenses of equal or greater 
severity. 
The presence of harmful system trespassers who find that higher risks provide 
them with a greater test for their abilities also complicates the deterrence argument, 
particularly considering how the thrill of avoiding detection in high-risk scenarios may 
actually encourage further attacks. Stiren and Applegate (2012) note in their survey of 
inmates at a Work Release Center that higher perceived excitement of an offense 
increases the likelihood that an individual would engage in it. They did not look at 
cybercrime perpetrators, but the findings are still noteworthy in suggesting that 
excitement may be a benefit that can possibly overrule risk. Wood and colleagues (1997) 
do discuss how certain symbolic or physiological responses to committing a crime may 
serve to reinforce that behavior. If computer trespassers experience a “high” or a sense of 
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accomplishment from conducting their attacks, then that could reinforce that behavior 
prompting them to do it again, particularly if they feel that they will not be caught or 
punished. Indeed, several studies do report computer trespassers feeling accomplished or 
respected when they complete attacks, regardless of what damage is caused (Jordan & 
Taylor, 1998; Taylor, 1999; Turgeman-Goldschmidt, 2008), indicating less regard for 
causing harm and more interest in achieving recognition or a “high”. 
Finally worth noting is that some self-identified hackers do not consider 
themselves criminals or dangerous people (Turgeman-Goldschmidt, 2008), but rather 
they just feel that they are good with computers or that there is no harm in exploring or 
conducting minor offenses such as downloading music or videos without paying. Others 
however, are not as benign in their activities. Seebruck (2015) highlights the range of 
trespasser categories in his discussion on various typologies by offering five differing 
ideologies that fuel why trespassers offend. These five types are social or political 
ideology, recreation, profit, revenge or prestige. All but perhaps recreation could drive 
trespassers to cause great harm, and if they are committed enough to their objective, 
deterring them may prove rather difficult. For example, if the trespasser is motivated by 
prestige, presenting them with indications that they have been discovered or detected may 
actually entice them into continuing their attack in order to prove that they are skilled 
enough to avoid punishment. 
Even with these typologies offering strong motivation for some, conveying that 
the costs outweigh the rewards to trespassers should still be as important for deterring 
trespassers as for other offenders. If the costs are seen as high enough, then the deterrence 
argument should still be effective. Detecting system trespassers and actually 
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demonstrating that there is a higher certainty of being caught may also be enough to 
outweigh the excitement (Goodman, 2010). If however, trespassers can conduct attacks 
without being identified or punished, then it is likely that they will not be deterred in any 
way from trespassing on another system. This is more problematic for trespassers with 
more malicious motivations, such as revenge or profit, as they are likely to cause more 
harm, but they also more prone to try and avoid detection in any way. Merely threatening 
sanctions also may not be enough as it may not be taken seriously by hackers if they have 
no reason to believe any punishment will actually occur, or if they feel that they will earn 
more recognition by continuing with their attacks (Young & Zhang, 2007; Young, Zhang, 
& Prybutok, 2007). As such, the chances of all system trespassers being completely 
deterred from engaging in future attacks are likely low unless the certainty of punishment 
can be increased, but they may still be influenced to adjust their behavior if the situation 
requires it. Even for those who have been identified in the past, they may return to 
trespassing if they believe that they have learned from past encounters and can more 
successfully avoid detection in future attacks. 
In contrast to some of the aforementioned views, other studies do suggest that 
restrictive deterrent approach is most appropriate when considering system trespassers, 
and indeed some studies do examine this and possible ways to affect their behavior. 
Wilson and colleagues (2015) found that the longer one trespassed on computers where a 
warning banner advising trespassers to disconnect was displayed, the more likely it was 
to have an impact on the number of commands that they entered, implying that the threat 
of detection and punishment suggested from the banner had an effect on behavior. 
However, if trespassers were not deterred by the banner’s presence in their initial attack, 
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they also appeared to be undeterred in any future attacks, indicating again that not 
everyone responds to deterrents in the same way, but that there could still be some 
effects. Maimon and colleagues (2014) also found that the presence of a warning banner 
had some effects by reducing the length of time trespassers spent on the system. Again 
however, this effect was not seen with everyone, with the incidents that were terminated 
within the first five seconds showing similarities on systems with and without the banner, 
indicating that the banner alone may not have had as strong of an effect. However, these 
studies still suggest that some trespassers will be deterred by security messages, such as 
warning banners, even if others are not. 
A recent study by Testa and colleagues (2017) also looks at how the presence of a 
warning banner can affect the behavior of trespassers. In particular, they were interested 
in those who continue with their attacks even after they have been shown a warning 
message. In examining how the trespassers utilize their access to the system, the authors 
found no support for their hypothesis that those seeing the warning message while on the 
system would spend less time exploring the system and instead would end their attack. 
This is contrary to some theoretical expectations as the warning message should increase 
the perceived certainty of detection and thus should result in more trespassers leaving the 
system. However, those who were on the systems with the warning banners did appear to 
enter different commands, specifically those that focused on changing the file 
permissions. This suggests that while they may not have been completely deterred, the 
banner still had some effect on some trespasser’s behavior. Also of noteis that the 
warning banner’s presence appeared to reduce the number of list-file commands and 
navigation-related commands. These examples suggest that restrictive deterrence may be 
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more applicable for system trespassers depending on what the deterrent is. As such, this 
thesis utilizes this theoretical perspective approach to identify what, if any, effects are 
seen when system trespassers are presented with a sign of detection in the form a series of 
messages attempting to initiate a conversation with them. Specifically, this thesis 
examines how implied discovery alone may impact the behavior of trespassers. 
2.4 The Current Thesis 
This thesis looks to further explore the behavior of system trespassers and how 
restrictive deterrence may play a role in their future behavior by potentially guiding them 
to alter their online behavior and how they approach their attack. In particular, I am 
studying whether the detection of hacker’s presence on the system influences hackers’ 
probability to (1) type the computer commands designed to gather intelligence, retrieve 
information and end processes on the attacked system, and (2) influences the volume of 
repeated system trespassing events originating from the same IP address used in their 
initial attack. 
Reconnaissance and obtaining information are noted as being important steps for 
system trespassing (Maimon et al, 2015; Wilson, 2001), tying into stage one of the 
trespassing events. It could be theorized through restrictive deterrence that being 
presented with a series of messages demonstrating to trespassers that they have been 
discovered on the system would result in a trespasser not entering any commands, 
including reconnaissance ones, and instead trying to avoid further detection. As such, the 
first hypothesis (1a) relating to reconnaissance commands is: System trespassers that are 
notified that they are detected on the system will utilize fewer reconnaissance-based 
commands when conducting their attacks compared to trespassers not receiving any 
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message. However, given the propensity some hackers have for risk-taking, the 
presentation of a detection message may result in the trespasser working to gather more 
information on the system. By doing so, they may want to better assess whether or not the 
messages’ presence indicates a legitimate risk, or they may be searching for something 
that they believe the system may be trying to protect. They may then try to enter more 
reconnaissance- focused commands to see who or what is contacting them and sending 
the messages. These messages may also be less of a deterrent and more of a motivator for 
hackers to gather more intelligence on the system, particularly if prestige is their primary 
drive. Hypothesis 1b then is as follows: System trespassers that are notified that they are 
detected on the system will utilize more reconnaissance-based commands when 
conducting their attacks compared to trespassers not receiving any message. 
Even after entering or evaluating a system, information and files are often sought 
by attackers, particularly within stages two and three of system trespassing events 
(Wilson, 2001; Yar, 2006). Again through restrictive deterrence, it is hoped that the 
detection messages would reduce the number of commands entered by trespassers as they 
would ideally want to avoid detection. Even if the trespassers want to attempt 
downloading or retrieving files or information, the detection messages may deter them 
from doing so and thus reduce the number of commands used to collect files and 
information (henceforth referred to as fetch commands). The second hypothesis then (2a) 
is: System trespassers that are notified that they are detected on the system will utilize 
fewer fetch-related commands when conducting their attacks compared to trespassers not 
receiving any message. As with the previous hypothesis though, the opposite may also be 
true. Testa and colleagues (2017) did find that the presence of a warning banner did not 
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necessarily deter trespassers, but it did appear to affect the commands entered, 
specifically those focused on altering file permissions and those related to system 
navigation. It is possible that hackers may view the risk of detection as a testament to 
their abilities and thus they may look to leave a mark of some sign or seek to collect a 
“trophy” from their intrusion (Jordan and Taylor, 1998). As a result, trespassers may be 
enticed to gather more information on the system that detects their presence. And so an 
alternate hypothesis (2b) is presented as: System trespassers that are notified that they 
are detected on the system will utilize more fetch-related commands when conducting 
their attacks compared to trespassers not receiving any message. 
While higher risks may tempt some attackers, others may try to eliminate or 
reduce those perceived risks if it means that they can resume their attack with less 
pressure. As such I am also interested in exploring the effect of detection on commands 
seen in stage three of a trespassing attack that are focused on disabling a system, or parts 
of it, making them especially dangerous should they deactivate something important to 
the user. Considering the damage these commands may cause, one would hope that the 
detection messages would serve as an effective deterrent and reduce the number of times 
these commands are entered. The third hypothesis (3a) is: System trespassers that are 
notified that they are detected on the system will utilize fewer removal or kill commands 
when conducting their attacks compared to trespassers not receiving any message. An 
alternate view however is that these disabling commands could also be used by 
trespassers who have been detected in an attempt to disable or remove any file or 
application that they think could be responsible for identifying them. Hypothesis 3b then 
is as follows: System trespassers that are notified that they are detected on the system 
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will utilize more removal or kill commands when conducting their attacks compared to 
trespassers not receiving any message. 
Another method hackers may use to avoid detection is through spoofing, or 
changing, IP Addresses in order to hide or alter their identify (Yar, 2006). Those who are 
returning to the system, but who have already encountered the detection messages, may 
elect to change the IP address that they use to avoid repeated detection by whomever they 
believe is initiating the conversation, thereby still offending but demonstrating a possible 
example of restrictive deterrence. The fourth hypothesis then is as follows: Computers 
with the detection messages shown to attackers will have fewer repeat IP Addresses 
present then those without the messages. In addition, whether or not offenders return at 
all may depend on whether or not they witnessed the message, and so a final hypothesis 
is that IP Addresses first appearing on computers without the detection messages will be 
more likely to reappear in subsequent attacks compared to those seen on computers with 
the messages on their first attack. Through these proposed hypotheses, further 
information on restrictive deterrence and cybercrime will be obtained and analyzed.  
3. DESIGN AND METHODS 
This thesis makes use of research honeypots set up on a university network in 
Israel. Honeypots are computer systems made to resemble working computers and are 
defined as a “security resource whose value lies in being probed, attacked, or 
compromised” (Spitzner, 2003, p. 40). In this instance, the honeypots (which will 
henceforth be referred to as target computers) used are for research purposes and are set 
up to resemble legitimate servers on the university network. As part of the experiment, 
approximately 250 target computers were developed and deployed on the institute’s 
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network where they ran consistently from February to September of 2015. The computers 
utilized IP Addresses matching those given from the University technology team to 
appear more legitimate, and ran using the Linnux CentOS 6.0 operating system, a free 
computing platform available to the public. Access to the target computers was available 
via a susceptible and highly scanned entryway. The computers were designed to deny 
entry for trespassers until they had either attempted entry several times or they utilized a 
frequent password seen in computers for entry. Once they had entered the system, the 
trespassers were randomly assigned and diverted to either a treatment or control 
computer, with the treatment being the attempted initiation of a conversation through the 
presentation of a series of messages. Any trespassing instance was then monitored and 
recorded in order to gain a range of information on the trespasser and their behaviors 
when approaching the system. 
Trespassers sent to both computers were given free reign on the system. In order 
to examine the impact that the presentation of detection messages would have on system 
trespassers, treatment computers would present a series of notifications in an attempt to 
engage in conversation with system trespassers, beginning with “who are you?”. The 
remaining questions presented to trespassers were as follows: “Why are you here?” “We 
are currently tracking your original IP address & geographic location. We are fully aware 
that the IP address that you use to attack our server - [Attacker IP address here] - does not 
represent your geographic location.” “We are currently recording every communication 
to and from our server. This is what we recorded from the last couple of minutes....” 
“Please disconnect immediately”. All of these messages heightened the implication of 
potential detection, particularly with the display of their IP Address and their recent 
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activity on the server. While leaving out mentions of punishment, the presentation of 
these continued messages suggested not only that their presence was detected, but also 
that there was an increase in the certainty of the trespasser being identified. Control 
computers had no messages presented to the hackers, but everything else remained the 
same, thus allowing for information on the effect of the messages to be analyzed. Some 
computers also contained fabricated data resembling University records as well as 
information on research and false student identification. The presence of this content was 
intended to make the computers appear more legitimate to hackers once they had begun 
exploring the system more thoroughly. 
System trespassing events were monitored and recorded as well if the hacker 
responded with any commands or answered any of the questions presented. Information 
gathered in the logs collected from the computers includes commands typed, any 
communication to and from the system server, and information on both successful and 
failed trespassing attempts. Also collected were videos of the target computers’ screens 
when an attack took place to allow for further analysis of hacker behavior. Several 
changes were made to some of the operating procedures during the initial phases of the 
experiment in order to increase the number of trespassers accessing the system. No 
subject was recruited, rather the target computers were left running for the duration 
allowing for trespassers unaware of the experiment to access the system. Ultimately, over 
60,000 system trespassing events were recorded across 249 target computers used in this 
study. These were divided closely across both the treatment and control computers, with 
30,407 events on the treatment computers and 30,042 on the controls. 
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3.1 Dependent Variables 
For this study, the attackers’ IP addresses and the commands that they utilized are 
of primary interest. In particular, usage commands with a reconnaissance, fetch, and 
disabling focus are examined. The reconnaissance – focused commands of interest here 
are used to gather the history of commands that have been entered on the system 
previously (listed as history_usage) and to see the details of the computers network 
configuration (ifconfg_usage). Both of these commands are not inherently damaging, but 
they would commonly be seen in stage one of a trespassing event and they do allow for 
trespassers to gather more detailed information on the system that they are accessing 
which could then be used against it. Both of these individual commands, history_usage 
and ifconfg_usage, can be classified as reconnaissance-focused, and so for this study they 
were grouped into one count variable reflecting the occurrences of both commands. This 
was done by generating a new variable that combined the occurrences of both individual 
commands to reflect the number of times that they appeared in a session. The new 
variable reflecting these instances was labeled recon_usage. 
The fetch-related commands include retrieving a listing the files on the system 
(ls_usage), and downloading files or information (wget_usage). While the file listing 
command could be considered reconnaissance, it could also arguably be directly 
connected to fetch commands as it provides a list of files or information that could then 
be taken by the trespassers. As such, it is grouped with the retrieval command in the 
fetch-related group. This will also be reflected in a count variable of the two commands 
combined, labeled as fetch_usage. Again, to generate this new command, the instances of 
the variables ls_usage and wget_usage were combined together into the new variable to 
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reflect the number of times that they appeared. 
Finally, commands that could disable or more directly damage system involve 
removing files or programs (rm_usage) or terminating an application or program 
(kill_usage) were of interest and examined. These are the potentially more damaging 
commands that could be seen in the final stage of a trespassing event. As with the prior 
two command groupings, a new variable was generated here as well to reflect the number 
of times these disabling commands appeared across the sessions. The new variable, 
disable_usage, was generated by combining both the rm_usage and kill_usage variables 
in order to identify sessions that had these commands appear (see TABLE 1 for a 
description of all commands). 
The total number of honeypots used in this study was 249 with an average of 
around 224 sessions on each. Across all sessions, the overall number of commands was 
quite low with no more then 200 of each observed in over 60,000 events, translating to a 
rate of under 33 per 10,000 sessions. Each command category was tested with the target 
computer type individually for the first three hypotheses. The rates of commands per 
10,000 sessions were also calculated and tested. The dependent variables for the fourth 
and fifth hypothesis are the number of duplicated IP Addresses appearing on each target 
computer. Variables counting the number of duplicates per target computer were 
constructed by tagging and separating any duplicates observed at the session level. The 
tagged duplicates revealed that the total number of IP Addresses appearing across all 
sessions was 1,429 with only 398 appearing once during the entire course of the 
experiment. Of the 398 unique IP Addresses, 200 appeared on control computers while 
198 appeared on treatment ones. Using the identified 398 unique IP addresses, I find that 
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the rate of unique IP Addresses across the 60,449 sessions is 65.84 per 10,000 sessions.  
TABLE 1: Command Descriptions 
Command Name Description 
ifconfg_usage Interface configuration – a way to observe and configure the network 
history_usage Obtain the history of commands used on the system 
ls_usage List all files in the system 
wget_usage Retrieve or download files 
rm_usage Remove or delete files from the system 
kill_usage End a process – can be done without logging out 
fetch_usage Count variable of the combined instances of ls_usage and wget_usage 
recon_usage Count variable of the combined instances of ifconfg_usage and history_usage 
disable_usage Count variable of the combined instances of rm_usage and kill_usage 
 
3.2 Independent Variables 
The experimental conditions for this study serve as the main independent 
variables. Namely, whether or not the target computer accessed had the detection 
message or not is the focus as the proposed thesis is meant to identify any differences 
between the treatment and control groups. The target computers were coded as binary 
variables representing the treatment and control groups with those having the 
conversation messages identified as the treatment and all others as the controls. 
Additional analyses were also conducted separating the target computers into four 
categories based on whether or not the computer contained fabricated content or not, and 
whether or not they contained the treatment condition. In total, 30,042 sessions appeared 
on control computers while 30,407 appeared on treatment computers. These target 




In order to test the main hypotheses, independent sample t-tests were used to 
compare the command categories as well as the rates of the commands, the combined 
command variables, and IP address duplicates across both groups in the experiment. Chi-
square testing was also done to compare the individual commands that made up the 
different commands category variables across honeypot types. While t-tests and chi-
square testing and are sufficient for observing the differences between the two groups, 
poisson and logistic regression models were also included in the analyses to observe any 
relationships with additional variables that could have an impact on the outcomes.  
4. RESULTS  
4.1 Commands Entered by Trespassers 
An initial t-test to compare session numbers across the two computer types 
revealed no significant differences, and so this should not affect the consistency of later 
results. To examine the first three hypotheses regarding the commands entered by 
trespassers on the control and treatment groups, three separate t-tests were run with the 
combined command variables. The first, the reconnaissance command variable 
(recon_usage), showed significant results (p<.000) with more commands entered on the 
treatment computers then on the controls (See TABLE 2 for t-test results). Dividing the 
recon_usage variable into the two separate reconnaissance commands, history_usage and 
ifconfg_usage, and running a chi-square analyses revealed that the history command 
variable was highly significant, while the network configuration variable was not (See 
TABLE 3 for chi-square results). Testing the rate of the history and configuration 
commands per 10,000 sessions, reveals significant differences again for the history 
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variable but not the network configuration. 
 TABLE 2: T-Test Results 
Command and 
Rates Means and Standard Errors 
fetch_usage Control:  𝜇 =  .010  Std. Dev. = .112 
Treatment: 𝜇 =  .011  Std. Dev. = .110 
recon_usage*** Control:  𝜇 =  .004  Std. Dev. = .065 
Treatment:  𝜇 =  .084  Std. Dev. = .277 
disable_usage Control:  𝜇 =  .011  Std. Dev. = .137 
Treatment:  𝜇 =  .013  Std. Dev. = .148 
***p<.001 
TABLE 3: Chi-square Results [1] 
***p<.001 
For the second hypothesis focusing on fetch-related commands, neither the 
analysis examining the fetch_usage variable, or its individual commands (ls_usage and 
wget_usage) were significant. This was also the case when examining the rates of the two 
individual commands. The disable_usage command was also insignificant as were the 
individual commands to kill programs or remove software or files, although there were 
slightly more of these commands viewed on the treatment computers. Examining the 
Command Command Means 
for Treatment 
Command Means 
for Control  
Chi-Square Results 
history_usage*** 𝜇 = .083 Std Dev. = .275 
𝜇 = .003 




ifconfg_usage 𝜇 = .001 
Std. Dev.=.029 




ls_usage 𝜇 = .008 
Std. Dev.=.087 
𝜇 = .008 
Std. Dev. = .087 
Pearson 𝐶ℎ𝑖!=.010  
p=.917 
wget_usage 𝜇 = .003 
Std. Dev.=.055 




kill_usage 𝜇 = .004 
Std. Dev. = .067 




rm_usage 𝜇 = .009 
Std. Dev.=.093 





rates for these commands also did not yield any significance. The initial analyses 
conducted here show some support for the alternate first hypotheses, but not for either 
part of the second or third. However, given that additional factors or variables may have 
an impact on these results, several additional analyses were conducted. 
In order to better examine the command variables of interest in the first three 
hypothesis, and possible relationships between several other variables that could be 
influencing the results, poisson and logistic regression models were run following the 
initial analyses. The poisson model was selected for the combined command variables 
(fetch_usage, recon_usage, and disable_usage) as they were count variables. The logistic 
model was used for the binary command indicators that made up the individual command 
variables. The target computer classification was used as the primary independent 
variable for all analyses. Two additional variables were also included in the models. The 
first was the successful attempt number corresponding to how many tries the trespasser 
took to access the system. This was included as it could theoretically correspond to the 
skill of the hacker, with fewer attempts possibly indicating more skill, which could then 
impact what commands the trespasser was aware of and which ones they would then 
likely use. IP Address duplication was also included in the model given that repeat 
trespassers may change their tactics, particularly if they are returning to system and have 
already seen the messages. 
For the poisson regression models, only the reconnaissance combined command 
showed a significant relationship with the target computer type. For the fetch_usage and 
the disable_usage categorical variables, only IP duplicates were significant (See TABLE 
4 for poisson results). Logistic models were also run subsequently to determine if any of 
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the individual commands were significantly related to any of the other variables included 
in the model. Unsurprisingly, only the history command showed a significant relationship 
with the target computer type (p<.000) again with treatment computers being 
significantly more likely to have the command entered on them (See all logistic 
regression results in TABLE 5). Models with the outcomes of network configuration, file 
retrieval, file listing, file or program removal, and system or program termination all 
show the IP duplication variable is significantly related to the commands (p<.000). 
Overall however, results of these models though only show some support for the first 
hypothesis in relation to the history command while the remaining hypotheses are not 
supported by the results of these regressions. The results here do however suggest that IP 
addresses are related to command usage. 
TABLE 4: Poisson Regression Results  
Command	  Variable	  
and	  Coefficients	   fetch	   recon	   disable	  
Honeypot	  Type	   .069	   2.89***	   .081	  
Successful	  Attempt	  
Number	   .099	   .961***	   .136	  
IP	  Duplicate	   -­‐.000***	   .001***	   .000***	  
	   	   	   	  
***p<.001;	  **p<.05;	  *p<.01	  
	  
TABLE 5: Logistic Model Results 
Command	  Variable	  and	  Coefficients	  
history	   ifconfg	   ls	   wget	   kill	   rm	  
Honeypot	  Type	   3.25***	   .399	   .025	   .106	   .219	   .139	  
Successful	  Attempt	  Number	   .452***	   .442	   -­‐.008	   .577***	   .011	   -­‐.371***	  
IP	  Duplicate	   -­‐.000***	   -­‐.005***	   .001***	   -­‐.003***	   .004***	   .001***	  




4.2 Effect of Computer Content on Commands Used 
TABLE 6: Chi-square Results – Computers With and Without content 
*p<.05, ** p<.01, ***p<.001 
As previously mentioned, a number of computers were also set up with fabricated 
data to mimic legitimate University records while others were left blank. In order to 
examine if the presence of this fabricated content had any affect on the commands 
utilized, the previous analyses were re-run to determine if there were any significant 
differences between control computers with content, control computers without content, 











recon_usage*** 𝜇 = .004 Std Dev. 
=.067 
𝜇 = .004 
Std Dev. 
= .061 
𝜇 = .152 
Std Dev. = 
.359 
𝜇 = .006 





fetch_usage* 𝜇 = .010 Std Dev. 
= .109 
𝜇 = .010 
Std Dev. 
= .114 
𝜇 = .009 
Std Dev. = 
.102 
𝜇 = .013 





disable_usage** 𝜇 = .011 Std Dev. 
= .139 
𝜇 = .012 
Std Dev. 
= .134 
𝜇 = .011 
Std Dev. = 
.135 
𝜇 = .016 





history_usage*** 𝜇 = .004 Std Dev. 
= .061 
𝜇 = .003 
Std Dev. 
= .057 
𝜇 = .151 
Std Dev. = 
.358 
𝜇 = .006 





ifconfg_usage 𝜇 = .001 Std Dev. 
= .025 
𝜇 = .001 
Std Dev. 
= .024 
𝜇 = .001 
Std Dev. = 
.029 
𝜇 = .001 





ls_usage 𝜇 = .007 Std Dev. 
= .085 
𝜇 = .008 
Std Dev. 
= .088 
𝜇 = .007 
Std Dev. = 
.082 
𝜇 = .009 





wget_usage 𝜇 = .003 Std Dev. 
= .053 
𝜇 = .003 
Std Dev. 
= .051 
𝜇 = .002 
Std Dev. = 
.048 
𝜇 = .004 





kill_usage 𝜇 = .004 Std Dev. 
= .064 
𝜇 = .004 
Std Dev. 
= .057 
𝜇 = .004 
Std Dev. = 
.062 
𝜇 = .005 





rm_usage** 𝜇 = .007 Std Dev. 
= .085 
𝜇 = .008 
Std Dev. 
= .091 
𝜇 = .007 
Std Dev. = 
.084 
𝜇 = .011 






treatment computers with content, and treatment computers without content. Running a 
chi-square analysis revealed significant results for all three categories (See TABLE 6). 
The reconnaissance commands appeared to heavily favor the treatment computers with 
content, while the disabling and data-fetching commands appeared most often on the 
treatment computers without any content. When breaking these down into individual 
commands, only the history_usage and rm_usage commands are significant. 
Interestingly, neither of the fetch-related commands are significant at the .05 level, 
although the wget_usage command is close. 
4.3 IP Addresses Used by Trespassers 
To examine the fourth hypothesis, that fewer repeat IP Addresses will appear on 
treatment computers, a t-test was conducted after tagging and identifying the repeat IP 
addresses. This analysis showed significant results (p<.000) but in the direction opposite 
of what was expected. More repeat IP addresses seem to have been recorded on the 
treatment computers then the control computers with means of 978.05 (Std. Dev. = 
1167.29) and 855.66 (Std. Dev. = 1123.51) respectively. This indicates a rather 
substantial difference between the two groups with a good majority of repeat IP 
Addresses appearing on treatment computers, contrary to the fourth hypothesis. A 
poisson regression was also run with IP duplicates as the outcome along with the target 
computer type and successful attempt number included in the model also indicates a 
significant relationship between the computer type and IP duplication (p<.000). To test 
the final hypothesis, a poisson regression was again run, but this time including the 
specific target computer identification as the primary independent variable rather then its 
classification. All variables were significant in this model (p<.000) although the 
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coefficient of the target computer name (0.000) indicates a low increase in the rate of 
occurrence. Overall, both of these analyses do not indicate support for the fourth or the 
fifth hypothesis. 
4.4 Effect of IP Duplication on Commands Entered 
Given how significant the IP addresses were in the regression models focused on 
the first three hypotheses, additional analyses were run to examine how the results may 
differ when duplicate addresses are removed and accounted for. In order to do this, the t-
tests and chi-square analyses for the first three hypotheses were re-run again two different 
times. The first analysis was focused on sessions where IP addresses appeared for the 
first time only in the experiment. This resulted in the analyses of 1,429 sessions after all 
repeat occurrences of IP Addresses were dropped. Among these, only 398 IP addresses 
did not appear again in the experiment and so a second series of analyses focused on 
these unique addresses.  
TABLE 7: Chi-square Results – First IP Address Appearance 
***p<.001 
When re-running the analyses for the first three hypotheses with each of these 
Command Command Means in 
Treatment 
Command Means in 
Control 
Chi-Square Results 
history_usage 𝜇 = .012 
Std Dev. = .109 
𝜇 = .002 
Std Dev. = .043 
Pearson 𝐶ℎ𝑖!=6.27 
p=.120 
ifconfg_usage 𝜇 = .009 
Std Dev. = .094 
𝜇 = .004 
Std Dev. = .060 
Pearson 𝐶ℎ𝑖!=1.48 
p=.224 
ls_usage 𝜇 = .021 
Std Dev. = .143 
𝜇 = .023 
Std Dev. = .149 
Pearson 𝐶ℎ𝑖!=.045  
p=.832 
wget_usage 𝜇 = .015 
Std Dev. = .121 
𝜇 = .012 
Std Dev. = .108 
Pearson 𝐶ℎ𝑖!=.191 
p=.662 
kill_usage 𝜇 = .003 
Std Dev. = .055 
𝜇 = .002 
Std Dev. = .043 
Pearson 𝐶ℎ𝑖!=.163 
p=.686 
rm_usage 𝜇 = .015 
Std Dev. = .121 
𝜇 = .009 




conditions only the reconnaissance variable was significant (p<.01). No significant results 
were found for any of the individual commands (See TABLE 7 for results). However, it 
is important to note that far more of the sessions with the IP addresses appearing for the 
first time were recorded on control computers (1,094) then on treatment ones (335), and 
so the results of the analyses could certainly be affected by this disparity. These analyses 
were also re-run for the unique IP Addresses which only appeared once across all 
recorded sessions. None of these results were significant (See TABLE 8). Given the low 
number of unique IP Addresses appearing once though across the sessions (398), several 
commands were not used at all in these sessions making the analyses irrelevant. 
TABLE 8: Chi-square Results – Unique IP Addresses Only 
***p<.001 
5. DISCUSSION 
Given the impact of cybercrime on technology and critical systems, further 
research has indeed been warranted on the subject. While existing research in 
criminology does look at cybercrime, and in particular at system trespassing, only a 
handful of studies have examined a restrictive deterrent impact on the behavior of 
Command Command Means in 
Treatment 
Command Means in 
Control 
Chi-Square Results 
history_usage 𝜇 = 0 
Std Dev. = 0 
𝜇 = .005 
Std Dev. = .071 
Pearson 𝐶ℎ𝑖!=.992 
p=.319 
ifconfg_usage 𝜇 = .010 
Std Dev. = .100 
𝜇 = .005 
Std Dev. = .071 
Pearson 𝐶ℎ𝑖!=.346 
p=.556 
ls_usage 𝜇 = .021 
Std Dev. = .143 
𝜇 = .01 
Std Dev. = .099 
Pearson 𝐶ℎ𝑖!=.000  
p=.992 
wget_usage 𝜇 = .005 
Std Dev. = .071 
𝜇 = .02 
Std Dev. = .140 
Pearson 𝐶ℎ𝑖!=1.79 
p=.181 
kill_usage 𝜇 = 0 
Std Dev. = 0 
𝜇 = .005 
Std Dev. = .071 
Pearson 𝐶ℎ𝑖!=.992 
p=.319 
rm_usage 𝜇 = 0 
Std Dev. = 0 
𝜇 = .005 




trespassers (Maimon et al., 2014; Testa et al., 2017; Wilson et al. 2015). For these prior 
studies utilizing a restrictive deterrence approach, the focus was on the impact of a 
warning banner that implied both surveillance and the possibility of punishment, and how 
its presence may affect behavior. No study up until this point had examined how 
attempting to initiate a conversation with a system trespasser, while also implying 
discovery, can impact their subsequent actions. 
Results of this study indicate some support for only the first hypothesis. Namely, 
hypothesis 1b, which argued for more reconnaissance commands on computers with the 
detection messages. It appears that trespassers may be more likely to search the history of 
the computer system when presented with a series of messages. This could be explained 
theoretically though as the messages shown may have actually driven more motivated 
trespassers to explore the system’s history to identify anything that may indicate where 
the messages are coming from. It is possible that by doing this, they may not have as 
much of a need to observe the network configuration if they have all of the information 
that they want from observing the history. It does however mean that, in this instance, the 
trespassers were not deterred by the detection messages as was hoped. Rather they 
appeared to have been more motivated to explore the system, falling in line with the 
theory that some trespassers are enticed by challenges to avoid detection or to further 
their prestige (Jordan & Taylor, 1998; Seebruck, 2015; Taylor, 1999; Turgeman-
Goldschmidt, 2008). 
Unexpectedly, neither part of the second or third hypotheses was supported. 
Theoretically, trespassers would enter a system to either retrieve information or to cause 
some damage (Wilson, 2001; Yar, 2006), but the number of commands entered overall 
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relating to these categories was low. Not finding support for the second and third 
hypothesis was surprising as it was theorized restrictive deterrence would have worked. If 
it had not worked, then it was expected that conveying to the trespassers that they were 
discovered would potentially motivate trespassers to not only attempt to retrieve more 
information and files from the system, but also to potentially attempt to cripple or 
damage the target computers to ensure that they are not identified further. Neither of 
these scenarios were supported. One possible explanation is that the trespassers may not 
have felt that the messages effectively increased the certainty of punishment and that the 
mere discovery of their presence was not enough to fully deter them. As such they may 
not have felt the need to damage the system or kill any programs. It is also possible that 
they had already explored the system’s history and layout and did not find anything of 
interest, and so they subsequently used no additional commands. Another explanation 
though is that many of the trespassers on the system could have been more recreationally 
motivated and were merely practicing and not actually interested in obtaining anything 
other then practice from the system. 
Interestingly, when accounting for whether or not the target computers had 
fabricated content on their systems or not, more of the command variables were found to 
be significant than when only accounting for whether or not the computer had the 
treatment or control condition. The combined reconnaissance variable as well as the 
individual history command both appeared considerably more often on the treatment 
computers that had the content then on any other computer type. It is possible that by 
observing the presence of content, the trespassers were more inclined to enter 
reconnaissance-related commands in order to obtain more information on the content and 
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its history. For the fetch-related and disabling commands however, most appeared on the 
treatment computers without any content. While this is somewhat surprising, it is possible 
that the trespassers who entered in these commands did so prior to observing whether or 
not the computers had any content as they would have had to do some explorations of the 
system first in order to observe whether or not any content was present. These results 
here do not change the outcomes for any of the hypotheses though as we still observe the 
same significant or insignificant differences between the treatment and control computers 
when not considering the presence of fabricated content. These results do however 
suggest possible explanations for why so many reconnaissance commands were used on 
some of the treatment computers, and they also suggest that future studies may want to 
examine more closely the impact content on computers can have on trespassers’ 
behavior. 
Results for the fourth and fifth hypothesis were significant, but in the direction 
opposite of what was expected. More repeat IP addresses appeared on computers with the 
detection messages rather then those without them. This was unexpected as those who 
had been on the system before would have theoretically thought to alter their IP Address, 
especially if the first computer they encountered had the detection message. Given the 
very low rate of unique IP Addresses though, it does appear that the vast majority did not 
change their IP Address with most trespassers returning at least once. It is possible that so 
many returned because the messages did not serve as an effective deterrent. The 
messages, while conveying detection and surveillance, may ultimately not have been 
taken seriously by trespassers and so the certainty of punishment for them was 
unaffected. It is also quite likely that many of the IP Addresses were fabricated or 
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spoofed allowing for a further increase in the anonymity that trespassers often enjoy 
(Jordan & Taylor, 1998). This would allow the trespassers to feel that the certainty of 
punishment was so low it was insignificant, and so they could return to the system 
without changing their IP Addresses while feeling confident that they would not be 
caught. A final possibility is that trespassers had set up their own hacking program meant 
to repeatedly attack a system without regard to any messages or firewalls presented. 
Should this be the case, the IP Addresses also would not change and would instead 
continue to reappear as programmed.  
5.1 Limitations 
The last point made can and should be listed as a possible limitation. It cannot be 
determined if the trespasser was a person or a bot designed by a person on the other end 
of the system. This means that we may not see the same rationalizing process in this 
scenario from the trespassing entity as in those for other crimes with other offenders. As 
such, restrictive deterrence would not apply as well, if at all. However, we can also argue 
that even if a bot was being used in the trespassing events it would still have to have been 
designed and deployed by a human, and so the designer would still likely apply some 
measures to the programmed bot to avoid detection along with some instructions for what 
commands should be used. 
A limitation relating to the commands entered by trespassers should also be noted. 
With a rate of under 33 per 10,000 sessions, very few commands were entered relative to 
the total number of sessions. This could imply several things. First, if the trespassers were 
mostly bots programmed to access systems, they simply may not have been programmed 
to utilize these commands. Instead, they could have had other commands and options 
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written in that were used to explore the target computers. Should this have been the case, 
the sessions in which commands were entered could have then involved an actual person 
on the other end, rather then a bot, who were actively making decisions on what 
commands to enter based on what they were seeing in the computers. The results would 
then hold more significance and implications regarding trespassers decision-making. 
Unfortunately, it cannot be determined for sure if this is the case. 
Another limitation is that trespassers may have deduced that it is a honeypot 
computer or that the messages were automated and therefore they may have had no fear 
regarding detection or punishment. However, considering that the target computers were 
designed to mimic legitimate university computers even when they did not contain any 
content, the chances of the trespassers recognizing the computers as honeypots are likely 
low. Finally, the skill of trespassers is also relevant in this discussion. I was only able to 
observe the commands and addresses of those who accessed the computers in the give 
time frame. As such, there are a great deal of trespassers who had no interaction with our 
computers, and so we cannot know or observe how they would have responded. This 
does create an issue for the generalizability of the results. However, given that it is the 
first study of its kind to observe these behaviors, the results are still worth considering 
and are a good starting point for future research.  
5.2 Conclusion and Implications 
Future research should continue to examine the commands and IP addresses 
utilized by trespassers when they are presented with messages indicating they have been 
identified. To allow for more subjects, it may be beneficial to run target computers for 
longer then seven months as more trespassers may enter the system if it is available for a 
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longer time frame. Spreading out the messages or changing them to resemble a person 
rather then a bot could also be useful to deceive more trespassers. Finally, the greatest 
interest for future studies should be finding ways to both imply detection and strongly 
convey that punishment is likely as it is still very possible to observe restrictive deterrent 
effects on system trespassers. 
Changes to the messages displayed may be particularly important as the messages 
presented in this study implied only discovery and not what the punishment would be if 
the trespassers were successfully identified. Prior studies examining the warning banner 
effects on trespassers included mentions that trespassers’ conduct was illegal and thus 
they implied that the trespasser could then be punished (Maimon et al., 2014; Testa et al., 
2017; Wilson et al. 2015). This mention of punishment could convey a bigger threat than 
what the messages in the current thesis did, which may explain why the results here were 
mostly insignificant. Further studies may then benefit more from actively conveying 
possible punishments and the certainty that they will occur in order to potentially deter 
more system trespassers. 
Until we can determine more information about trespassers and the commands 
that they enter in different situations, we cannot from this study support the utilization of 
conversational or detection messages. While most hypotheses were unsupported, those 
that were indicate more commands entered and more return IP Addresses on computers 
with the detection messages. As a result, we find no support for detection messages 
serving as effective deterrents even from a restrictive deterrent perspective. While it is 
good that fetch-related and program killing or removing commands did not appear more 
often, the goal would have been to have a reduction of all commands in the treatment 
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computers. One recommendation then would be to try to study more effects that 
messages have on trespassers in different areas other then those examined in this study. 
Changing what the messages say and how they are displayed may also be helpful, 
especially if they can serve as better deterrents by mentioning punishments. In this study 
the messages all appeared at the very beginning of the trespassing event and were 
finished in less then three minutes. Having messages displayed more often or conveying 
more severe punishments may yield different results. More research overall is needed on 
the effects that messages have to better determine if they can be effective deterrents for 
system trespassers. 
Cybercrime and the people who engage in it are surrounded by layers of secrecy 
(Holt & Kilger, 2012; Taylor, 1999; Turgeman-Goldschmidt, 2008; Yar, 2006), but what 
has been seen suggests that system trespassers may be less-likely to be deterred by 
common measures (D’Arcy, Hovav, & Galleta, 2009; Goodman, 2010; Maimon et al., 
2014; Wilson et al., 2015). In particular, the idea that many engage in hacking because of 
the risks or challenges involved suggests that increasing the severity or certainty of 
punishment may actually generate more of a challenge for hackers to attempt. As such, 
this study used a restrictive deterrence approach to observe how trespassers may alter 
their behavior when it is implied that they have been detected and are being monitored. 
The results do not indicate that the messages had a dramatic effect on trespassers when 
compared to those on computers with no messages. This is telling in and of itself as it 
does confirm that trespassers in cyberspace may not behave the same as offenders in 
person, particularly when responding to restrictive deterrents. Thus, this study can then 
pave the way for further research and observations of system trespassers to identify and 
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